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UNIONIZING AMERICA'S PRISONS-ARBITRATION AND
STATE-USE
[O]ne first step to take with respect to the prison system is to
mute talk of rehabilitation and concentrate on another somewhat
different question: how much harm is the system doing and
how much harm can we stop?'
Attempts to answer Dean Paulsen's question have resulted in cries
for sweeping reforms.2 Even among those who desire eventual aboli-
tion of the prison system,' it is recognized that there exists a need for
immediate changes in certain aspects of the present prison structure.
Prisoner employment has become one of the most critical problem areas
needing improvement. Enforced idleness, low wages, lack of normal em-
ployee benefits, little post-release marketability, and imposition of mean-
ingless tasks are all examples of present harms existent in American
prisons." At various penal institutions throughout the country, prisoners,
ex-convicts and other persons are organizing prisoner labor unions5 as a
possible means of securing improved employment conditions. An exam-
ination of the demands made by such unions illustrates the need for a
general restructuring of the marketing and manufacturing of prison goods.
THE PRISONER As A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
Courts no longer consider the prisoner a "slave of the state."0 The
1. Paulsen, Prison Reform in the Future-The Trend Toward Expansion of Pris-
oners' Rights, 16 VILL. L. REv. 1082, 1083 (1971).
2. See, e.g., AMIERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971).
3. Id.
4. [S]ometimes two or three inmates are assigned to do a task that would
require only one worker in private industry. . . . In all prison systems idle-
ness still obtains for a large part of the inmate population.
• . . Skills learned by the inmates are seldom marketable when they are
released. . . The work done . . . produces skills that can be applied only
by men who have returned to prison.
• . . The whole operation lacks efficiency, incentives, production norms
and the complex of operational goals and attitudes that are the hallmark of
successful industrial endeavor.
National Council on Crime & Delinquency, Policy Statement on Compensation of Ilmoate
Labor, 34 Aie. J. ComcnoNs 42, 42-43 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Policy Statement].
5. See notes 52-58 infra & text accompanying.
6. The prisoner is [not] a temporary "slave of the State," . . . and prison
officials are not now such masters of their own domain as to be free of . . .
[constitutional] restraints.
Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 108 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See also Holt v. Sarver, 309
F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). In Holt, the court
declared Arkansas' incarceration system to be violative of the eighth amendment's pro-
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judicial standard with regard to prisoners' rights is that "[a] prisoner
retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen, except those expressly, or by
necessary implication, taken from him by law."7 Therefore, it would
appear that the prisoner has the right to organize if (1) ordinary citizens
have such a right and (2) the right has not been expressly, or by neces-
sity, taken from him by the state.
Prisoners are presently seeking rights comparable to those of ordi-
nary citizens who are employed by the state." The argument over recogni-
tion of prisoners as public employees centers on the question of whether a
prisoner can properly be termed an "employee." The main objection to
recognition is that prisoners do not voluntarily enter into their work re-
lationships with the state.' Proponents of recognition would remove
volition as the sole factor and concentrate on the total character of the
work relationship;' if work performed by a nonprisoner would be classi-
fied as "employment," it ought to be similarly defined when done by a
prisoner." This latter approach seems to be more in line with modern
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The system consisted of two work
farms where inmates were forced to labor regardless of the weather and without ade-
quate clothing. Prisoners were also forced to work for friends of the wardens and
members of the parole board. For a discussion of Holt and the possible role of the
eighth amendment in prisoners' rights litigation, see Comment, The Role of the Eighth
Amendment in Prison Reform, 38 U. CHI L. Rxv. 647 (1971).
7. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887
(1945). For more recent cases applying this standard, see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319
(1972) (right to free exercise of religion and to petition the government for redress
of grievances) ; Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 454 (1st Cir. 1971) (right to communicate
with the press) ; Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (right to freedom of
speech) ; National Prisoners Reform Ass'n v. Sharkey, No. 4884 (D.R.I. April 28, 1972)
(right to freedom of association); Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (right to receive literature).
8. Memorandum on Behalf of Union, In re The Prisoners' Labor Union at Green-
haven & The Dep't of Correctional Servs. of the State of N.Y. & The Greenhaven Cor-
rectional Facility, No. C-0794 (N.Y. State Public Employment Relations Bd., filed
Sept., 1972) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum on Behalf of Union]. See also Com-
ment, Labor Unions for Prison Inmates: An Analysis of a Recent Proposal for the Or-
ganization of Inmate Labor, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 963, 968-69 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Inmate Labor].
9. See, e.g., Memorandum for Respondent at 21-25, In re The Prisoners' Labor
Union at Greenhaven & The Dep't of Correctional Servs. of the State of N.Y. & The
Greenhaven Correctional Facility, No. C-0794 (N.Y. State Public Employment Relations
Bd., dated Sept. 8, 1972).
10. Memorandum on Behalf of Union, supra note 8, at 16-21.
11. Determining the employment status of prisoners in states which have public
employee bargaining statutes can be accomplished by reference to the statutory defini-
tion of public employee. For an example of this technique, see Memorandum on Behalf
of Union, supra note 8.. See also Inmate Labor, supra note 8, at 966-68.
In states without public employee bargaining statutes, the employment status of
prisoners will have to be implied from other laws. For example, Indiana does not have
a public employee bargaining law, but it does have legislation providing for a merit
system of promotion for state employees. IND. CODE § 4-15-2 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §
60-1301 (Supp. 1972). Prisoners are not within the classification of employees covered
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legal trends in prisoners' rights.' The right of prisoners, as public
employees, to join or form a union exists only if ordinary public employ-
ees enjoy such a right. Two circuits have upheld this right.
In McLaughlin v. Tilendis," the Seventh Circuit held that a com-
plaint which alleged that the plaintiffs had been dismissed or not rehired
because of membership in a teachers union stated a cause of action for
which relief could be granted under the Civil Rights Act of 1871."4 In
so doing, it overruled the lower court's finding that there was no first
amendment right to join a labor union. In American Federation of State,
County & Municipal Employees v. Woodward,5 the Eighth Circuit found
that public employees have a constitutionally protected right to join a
labor union." The court reasoned that
[t]he First Amendment protects the right of one citizen to
associate with other citizens for any lawful purpose free from
governmental interference. . . . [TJhus [u]nion member-
ship is protected by the right of association under the First and
Fourteenth Amendment.'
Thus, prisoners, like other public employees, have a constitutional
right to organize. However, it has been suggested that such a constitu-
tionally protected freedom may be restricted if a "compelling state interest
centering about prison security, or a clear and present danger of breach
of prison discipline, or some substantial interference with orderly institu-
tional administration"' 8 is demonstrated.
To be sure, prison officials have the right to restrict inmate activities
which threaten the security of the institution.'" The means of regula-
tion, however, must be the least restrictive possible."
by the merit system, but they are designated as unclassified employees. IND. CoDE § 4-
15-2-7 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1303(a) (2) (1961). This designation only means
that prisoners are excluded from the merit system. It does not mean that they are not
public employees; indeed, the fact that they are mentioned at all suggests that they are
public employees.
12. Prisoners rights litigation, see note 7 supra, has shown that courts will no
longer allow imprisonment to justify any treatment of the prisoner. The judiciary has
begun to delve into the rationale behind prison regulations; a recital of "security" or
"rehabilitation" as the purpose of such regulations will not automatically justify them.
See notes 1&-23 infra & text accompanying. Similarly, the courts should not look to the
volition factor as the sole determinant of the public employee issue.
13. 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1963).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
15. 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969).
16. Id. at 138.
17. Id. at 139.
18. Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also
Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
19. Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 429 (S.D. Md. 1966).
20. Barnett v. Rogers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Wright v. McMann, 321
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"Security" or "rehabilitation" are not shibboleths to justify
any treatment. . . .When it is asserted that certain disabilities
must be imposed to these ends, courts may still inquire as to the
actuality of a relationship between means and ends.2
As a result, prison officials must be able to articulate a rationale which
goes beyond administerial inconvenience, before courts will determine
that inmates have no right to organize.22 Any limitation on prisoners'
rights will be struck down whenever
the prison authorities have not shown such remarkable success
in achieving any conceivable penological end by means which
entail the abridgment of these constitutional guarantees as might
make their denial seem worthwhile."
PROBLEMS IN ADAPTING THE LABOR UNION CONCEPT TO PRISONS
Since joining a union is a constitutionally protected right, it becomes
necessary to consider how private sector rules governing labor-manage-
ment relations must be altered to make the union viable within a prison
environment. The growth of the union movement within the public sector
has shown that many of the considerations and techniques at work in
private labor relations cannot be blindly applied to the public sphere.'
Of course the specific ways in which the union concept will be adapted
to a particular prison situation will vary depending, in part, on existing
state mediation or arbitration services and general state practices for
resolving public employee disputes. In states which have laws concerning
public employee collective bargaining, the extent of the bargaining obliga-
tion and its applicability will have to be determined by examining the
applicable statute.2" In states without such legislation, the obligation of
the prison officials will be much the same as that of any other state agency.
F. Supp. 127, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Note, Less Drastic Means and the First
Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
21. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 645 (E.D. Va. 1971).
22. Cf. Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir .1968).
23. 333 F. Supp. at 644.
24. Essential differences between the functioning and goals of the private and pub-
lic spheres necessitate the development of a different approach to collective bargaining
in the latter. Among the factors which may require particular attention in the public
sector are: (1) the impact of a public employee strike; (2) the fact that public services
do not have a market price; and (3) the possibility that the immediate employer is
without power to meet certain demands.
Everyone acknowledges that public sector collective bargaining lacks the real-
ism of private sector bargaining as a result of the required continuity and es-
sentiality of public service.
Zack, Ability to Pay in Public Sector Bargaining, N.Y.U. 23d CoNF. LAM. 403, 425
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Zack].
25. See Inmate Labor, supra note 8.
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Thus, in a state which has had no previous practice of bargaining col-
lectively with its public employees, prison officials would be under no
obligation to bargain with a prisoners union. However, a prison official
should not refuse to bargain simply because of the absence of statutory
authorization, since
the current attitude is not that collective bargaining has an un-
certain status unless it is specifically authorized, but that the
right to bargain collectively is an attribute of every critizen to
whom it is not denied by statute."
The most obvious problem in adapting the labor union concept to
prisons is finding an alternative to the strike as a means of resolving dis-
putes. 7 Undoubtedly, just as public employees have no right to strike,"3
prisoners unions will likewise be deprived of that right. 9 However,
even in the face of statutory prohibitions, public employees continue to
employ the strike as a bargaining technique. Thus, if a prison system
is to avoid strikes, it must provide meaningful alternatives. To be ef-
fective, these alternatives must include a final resort to binding arbitra-
tion." A less restrictive method of dispute resolution might be provided
as an intermediate step. Still, the inherent strength of prison manage-
ment's position, coupled with the fact that a strike would be ineffective
since prison labor is often unessential, necessitates assurance that a final
determination be made by an independent arbitrator."'
26. 1966 Op. IND. Aar'y GEN. 158. See also Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n v. Lewallen,
71 L.R.R.M. 2898 (S.D. Ind. June 19, 1969).
27. In addition to the strike, exclusive representation, the scope of negotiable
items, and the determination of a bargaining unit will present problems different than
those envisioned by labor laws applicable to the private sector. However, finding an
alternative to the strike is the most basic issue which must be considered.
28. Sviridoff, The Role of the Unions in the 197os, N.Y.U. 23d CoXF. LAB. 39, 43
(1971).
29. The justification for denying the right to strike to public employees is that the
public is entitled to an uninterrupted flow of goods and services. This justification
would seem to have little applicability to prison industries. Nevertheless, political con-
siderations will probably move authorities to deny prisoners unions the right to strike.
30. The efficacy of this type of provision in resolving community disptites is dis-
cussed in Haughton, Mediation of Community Disputes and the Labor-Management
Model, N.Y.U. 23d CONF. LAB. 23, 34 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Haughton].
[T]he parties [to a community dispute] . . . commit themselves to certain
settlement only when they voluntarily agree to final and binding arbitration of
unresolved issues.
Id.
31. The imbalance of power may even preclude negotiation or submission to arbi-
tration. Ronald Haughton, President of the Board of Mediation for Community Dis-
putes, has stated, "[T]he mediation and peaceful negotiation of community disputes has
been generally most useful when there has been some sort of balance of power. ... "
Haughton, supra note 30, at 27. It is true that persons in positions of authority have
often been unwilling to relinquish rights until confronted by a group with power. How-
ever, a group may have bargaining power by virtue of favorable public opinion or out-
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
A prison arbitrator will face certain bargaining difficulties not found
outside of the prison environment. Because the prison is a total institution,
arbitration of what may seem to be merely conditions of employment, will
necessitate giving consideration to other penological goals. For example,
a prisoner union may wish to bargain about training programs in order
to make them more viable for post-release employment; officials may see
the program as a rehabilitation program which is only secondarily a con-
dition of employment. Initially, the arbitrator must resolve this issue to
determine if the demand is a proper subject for bargaining. Also, the
prisoner union may wish to bargain about maximum working hours. If
officials believe that each inmate must work more hours in order to main-
tain a viable institution, then the prison authorities may characterize the
hours as a custodial consideraton. Undoubtedly there are many other
similar situations which will require added expertise on the arbitrator's
part.32
THE PRISONER'S DEMAND FOR EQUITABLE WAGES:
ECONOMIC & POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
While prisoners unions might be seen as a vehicle for arbitrating
all disputes between inmates and administrators,83 their expressed pur-
pose has been to secure equitable wages and improved employmgnt con-
ditions."' Practically speaking, a prisoner's wages must be derived either
from state subsidies or from income yielded by marketing prison products.
side support. Id. at 34. Thus, outside support for prisoner unions and a desire on the
part of prison officials to avoid violent confrontations may serve as a substitute for
internal strength of inmate unions.
32. Similarly, the arbitrator or mediator must possess different skills than the
private sector arbitrator. It will not be sufficient to be a "placid neutral mediator,"
Haughton, .vtpra note 30, at 34, since the mediator "must function to interpret positions
and problems of each party to the other, and to convey understanding of power relations
from one to the other." Id. at 35. In fact, the prison arbitrator may need to under-
stand the issues involved more fully than does the private arbitrator because he may be
called on to advocate and innovate solutions to disputes. Moreover, the arbitrator will
have a public responsibility, and, therefore, he must present resolutions which are po-
litically and economically viable. Cf. Zack, supra note 24, at 418.
33. See Judge Oakes' concurring opinion in Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 (2d
Cir. 1972).
34. See The Outlaw: Journal of the Prisoners Union, Nov.-Dec., 1972, at 1, col.
3 [hereinafter cited as The Outlaw] ; Letter from Richard A. Greenberg, Barbara A.
Shapiro, Lewis B. Oliver, Jr., and Lawrence D. Ross to members of the Prisoners La-
bor Union at Greenhaven, Oct. 10, 1972 (a copy of which is on file at the offices of the
Indiana Law Journal); Address by a member of the Prisoners Solidarity Committee,
Midwestern Conference on Women in the Law, at University of Michigan, Nov. 11,
1972. However, it has been suggested that the goals of the United Prisoners Union
"encompass the goals of a great many of the groups which together comprise the 'op-
pressed' class." Ininate Labor, supra note 8, at 975. Nevertheless, the United Prisoners
Union also advocates payment of minimum wages and other traditional labor benefits.
United Prisoners Union, The Bill of Rights of the Convicted Class, Art. III, § 2 (1971)
(a copy of which is on file in the offices of the Indiana Law Journal).
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The average inmate in the United States receives from ten to sixty-five
cents per day;f in fact, no prisoner's per day wage rate equals the federal
hourly minimum wage." The likelihood that subsidies bringing these
wages up to an equitable level will be assumed by already overburdened
state and federal budgets is minimal.Y Therefore, the products of prison
labor must be able to support inmate wages.
It seems highly unlikely that the present monopsonist, governmental
consumption of prison products could support such wage payments. 8
For many kinds of manufacture, the size of the State-use market
or the amount of inmate labor available, or both, do not suffice
to support the size of the plant needed to achieve the standards
of cost reduction and quality control which can be attained by a
large plant selling mainly to the private sector of the economy."9
Monopsony was not always the case: in 1924 all but five states sold
prison-made goods on the open market.4" Soon, however, irate labor
unions exerted political pressure against the sale of prison-made goods on
the open market.41 Prison products also encountered opposition from
private industry.12 Under these pressures from labor and management,
Congress passed legislation43 which resulted in the present state-use
35. Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 43.
36. Id.
37. Assuming a forty-hour work week, and compliance with federal minimum wage
rates, it would cost the Federal Bureau of Prisons approximately 81.5 million dollars to
pay the wages of inmates in federal prisons. In addition, it would cost state penal
authorities approximately 730 million dollars to pay state prisoner wages. These fig-
ures were derived from Bureau of Prisons statistics contained in DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Bu-
REAU OF PRISo Ns, BULL. No. 47, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS 2 (1972). The burden
which these expenditures would place on federal and state budgets becomes apparent
when it is realized that the total federal and state expenditures for correctional institu-
tions in 1969 were 92 million and 1.1 billion dollars, respectively. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION & DEP'T OF COmMERcE, BUREAU OF CENSUS,
EXPENDITURES & EMPLOYMENT FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMl: 1969-70, at 7
(1972).
38. Cf. Polky Statement, supra note 4.
39. PRESIDENT'S COMIISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 55 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE].
40. Rodli, Revolution in Prison Industries, 6 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 146 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Rodli].
41. JoiNT COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER & TRAINING, PERSPECTivEs
ON CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER & TRAINING 8 (1970).
42. "Whenever . . . private businesses could not sell their goods, political pres-
sure has mounted to prevent prisons from engaging in [competing] enterprises.
TASK FoRCe, supra note 39, at 54.
43. In 1929, Congress passed the Hawes-Cooper Act, 45 Stat. 1084 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 60 (1970)), which made prison goods subject to regulation by the state in
which they were sold. 49 U.S.C. § 60 (1970). Since states had the power to outlaw
the sale of prison goods, the result of Hawes-Cooper was to virtually extinguish the
interstate sale of such goods. The 1935 Ashurst-Summers Act, 49 Stat. 494 (codified
at 1S U.S.C. §§ 1761-62 (1970)), prohibited transportation of prison goods to states
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system. Since the present monopsonist distribution cannot support equit-
able prisoner wages, meeting the wage demands will ultimately require
selling prison products once again on the open market.4" If prison pro-
ducts are to compete, therefore, prison unions must obtain the support
of labor and manufacturing interests.4" If these interests are hostile the
prison industrial system cannot be changed.
Another reason for gaining the support of private industry and labor
is that prison unions alone will not be able to establish the requisite balance
of power necessary to insure their success." These outside forces would
serve as an insulating factor against possible official ire. Moreover, such
"friends in high places" could better marshall general public opinion in
favor of prisoners' demands.
where their sale was prohibited, Act of July 24, 1935, ch. 412, § 1, 49 Stat. 494, and re-
quired them to be labelled as inmate products, 18 U.S.C. § 1762 (1970). Finally, inter-
state transportation of prison goods was totally prohibited in 1940. Act of Oct. 14,
1940, ch. 872, 54 Stat. 1134 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (1970)). These three acts
resulted in the creation of the monopsonist system. See Rodli, supra note 40.
44. See TAsIc FORCE, supra note 39, at 55.
45. However, it has been suggested that some of the disadvantages of the monop-
sonist system at the state level may be eliminated by cooperation among states. Spe-
cifically, it has been urged that several bordering states could band together to form an
organization similar to Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (FPI), which coordinates and
controls production of goods at all federal prisons. TAsI FORCE, supra note 39, at 56.
While FPI has resulted in quality control, it has not bestowed many benefits on inmates.
In contrast to the proponents of regional efforts, Professor Lopez-Rey suggests:
[I] t would seem more advisable to advocate a closer parallelism between the two
kinds of labour [prison and free world] than to suggest the creation of voca-
tional and training programmes which the organization of prison labour, mostly
based on the State-use system, can very seldom afford.
Lopez-Rey, Some Considerations on the Character and Organization of Prison Labour,
49 J. CRim. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLIcE SCIENCE 10, 12 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Lopez-
Rey].
46. Perlis, Labor's Position on the Employment of Offenders, 6 CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 138, 140 (1960).
47. However, there need not be formal affiliation with any private union or com-
pany. Indeed, such affiliation is opposed by the Prisoners' Union of San Francisco:
Contact the most progressive labor unions in your area. Explain to them the
labor issues involved in our struggle and the desire to form a union. Do not
blanketly accept them but rather ask them for advice and help in forming your
union. You must maintain your status of a Prisoners' Union. The issues we
face are not just limited to labor but rather take into consideration all prob-
lems involving our incarceration. Hence help from existing labor unions is
helpful but co-option is very dangerous.
The Outlaw, supra note 34, at 1, col. 3. The Prisoners' Union also proposes that
any supportive non-convict group must be willing to accept convict leadership. Id.
48. Obviously, public awareness of inmate needs and grievances can be an
important means of getting political leaders and correctional administrators to
respond. . . . Inmate organizations allying themselves permanently -with out-
side groups may open up channels for communication and create an on-going
public role in internal prison affairs.
Note, Bargaining in Correctional Institutions: Restructuring the Relation between the
Inmate and the Prison Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726, n.65 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Bargaining].
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There are at least three reasons why labor and management should
not be hostile to prisoners' labor unions. First, since the great majority
of prisoners were in the labor force prior to conviction,49 and hopefully
will return to the work force upon release, there is no reason to sever
their connections with organized labor. Secondly, prison labor and inmate
products do not constitute a threat to outside labor and industry in today's
economy." Finally, both industry and labor, as responsible members of
society, must realize that the
counter-productive prison labor system [must] be changed, in
the belief that an inmate receiving equitable payment for work
performed will be able to provide some support of his family,
continue payments on his social security, provide restitution (if
this is applicable in his case), make some payment for room and
board and save money to assist himself upon his return to
society."
CONCLUSION
Attempts to organize prisoners are becoming increasingly common-
place. Organizing is presently occurring in at least six states. In Cali-
fornia, the United Prisoners Union claims a membership of over three
thousand. 2 California is also the headquarters of the Prisoners' Union
of San Francisco 3 and the Prisoners Legal Union at the Men's Colony
at San Luis Obispo." In New York, more than half of the inmates at
Greenhaven Correctional Facility are said to belong to the Prisoners'
Labor Union. "5 The State Prison of Southern Michigan is presently being
organized by another Prisoners Labor Union."8 A request for an election
has been made to the Delaware Department of Labor to determine if the
Imprisoned Citizens' Union ought to be accorded representative status
49. See Lopez-Rey, supra note 45, at 14. See also TAsK FORCE, supra note 39, at
3, Figure 2.
50. TASK FoRcE, supra note 39, at 55.
51. Policy Statement, supra note 4, at 43.
52. Bargaining, supra note 48, at 749, n.66.
53. Browning, Organizing Behind Bars, RAmPARTS, Feb., 1972, at 40, 43.
54. Bass, Correcting the Correctional System: A Responsibility of the Legal Pro-
fession, 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 125, n.81 (1971).
55. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1972, at 1, col. 2. Two other New York prisons, Wallkill
Correctional Facility and Bedford Hills Correctional Facility for Women, have also
formed unions which have demanded recognition. As with the Greenhaven union, these
unions have filed petitions for certification with the Public Employment Relations Board
in Albany. Hellerstein, Greenberg, Shapiro, Eisner & Pochoda, Summary of the His-
tory of the Prisoners Labor Union Movement in New York 2 (1972) (unpublished pa-
per on file in the offices of the Indiana Law Journal).
56. The Outlaw, supra note 34, at 1, col. 2. See also Prisoners Solidarity Com-
mittee: Michigan Newsletter, Jan., 1973, at 8.
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for Delaware inmates.57 Similar organizing is taking place in Ohio and
Pennsylvania.58
The present extent of the prison labor union movement indicates that
organization will most likely be attempted at other prisons. Thus,
prison officials, judges, and state agencies are going to be confronted fre-
quently with the problem of how to deal with the prisoner labor union. In
resolving this problem, the difficulties of applying the labor union concept
to the prison, especially in light of the need for a wholesale restructuring
of the prison economic system, should not override the benefits that re-
cognition will bring to the prison, the prisoner," and society as a whole.
[C]orrectional officials [must] seek more peaceful ways of
resolving prison problems than the old, ironclad, solitary-
confinement, mail-censoring, dehumanizing methods that have
worked so poorly in the past. Promoting or at least permitting
the formation of a representative agency might well be, in the
light of past experience, the wisest course for correctional of-
ficials to follow .... 0o
SARAH M. SINGLETON
57. 1 PRisoN L. REP. 313 (1972).
58. See Bargaining, supra note 48, at n.66.
59. For a discussion of the benefits of instituting formal bargaining within prisons,
see Bargaining, supra note 48, at 751-57.
60. Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1245-46 (2d Cir. 1972) (Oakes, J., con-
curring) (footnotes omitted).
